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Abstract
Adversarial perturbations can pose a serious threat for
deploying machine learning systems. Recent works have
shown existence of image-agnostic perturbations that can
fool classifiers over most natural images. Existing methods
present optimization approaches that solve for a fooling ob-
jective with an imperceptibility constraint to craft the per-
turbations. However, for a given classifier, they generate
one perturbation at a time, which is a single instance from
the manifold of adversarial perturbations. Also, in order
to build robust models, it is essential to explore the mani-
fold of adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we propose
for the first time, a generative approach to model the dis-
tribution of adversarial perturbations. The architecture of
the proposed model is inspired from that of GANs and is
trained using fooling and diversity objectives. Our trained
generator network attempts to capture the distribution of
adversarial perturbations for a given classifier and readily
generates a wide variety of such perturbations. Our exper-
imental evaluation demonstrates that perturbations crafted
by our model (i) achieve state-of-the-art fooling rates, (ii)
exhibit wide variety and (iii) deliver excellent cross model
generalizability. Our work can be deemed as an important
step in the process of inferring about the complex manifolds
of adversarial perturbations.
1. Introduction
Machine learning systems are shown [5, 4, 11] to be
vulnerable to adversarial noise: small but structured per-
turbation added to the input that affects the model’s pre-
diction drastically. Recently, the most successful Deep
Neural Network based object classifiers have also been ob-
served [29, 9, 19, 16, 22] to be susceptible to adversarial at-
tacks with almost imperceptible perturbations. Researchers
have attempted to explain this intriguing aspect via hypoth-
esizing linear behaviour of the models (e.g. [9, 19]), finite
training data (e.g. [3]), etc. More importantly, the adversar-
* Equal contribution.
ial perturbations exhibit cross model generalizability. That
is, the perturbations learned on one model can fool another
model even if the second model has a different architecture
or has been trained with different dataset [29, 9].
Recent startling findings by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [18]
and Mopuri et al. [21, 20] have shown that it is possible to
mislead multiple state-of-the-art deep neural networks over
most of the images by adding a single perturbation. That is,
these perturbations are image-agnostic and can fool multi-
ple diverse networks trained on a target dataset. Such per-
turbations are named “Universal Adversarial Perturbations”
(UAP), because a single adversarial noise can perturb im-
ages from multiple classes. On one side, the adversarial
noise poses a severe threat for deploying machine learning
based systems in the real world. Particularly, for the ap-
plications that involve safety and privacy (e.g., autonomous
driving and access granting), it is essential to develop ro-
bust models against adversarial attacks. On the other side,
it also poses a challenge to our understanding of these mod-
els and the current learning practices. Thus, the adversarial
behaviour of the deep learning models to small and struc-
tured noise demands a rigorous study now more than ever.
All the existing methods, weather image specific [29, 9,
19, 6, 17] or agnostic [18, 21, 20], can craft only a sin-
gle perturbation that makes the target classifier susceptible.
Specifically, these methods typically learn a single pertur-
bation (δ) from a possibly bigger set of perturbations (∆)
that can fool the target classifier. It is observed that for a
given technique (e.g., UAP [18], FFF [21]), the perturba-
tions learned across multiple runs are not very different. In
spite of optimizing with a different data ordering or initial-
ization, their objectives end up learning very close pertur-
bations in the space (refer sec. 3.3). In essence, these ap-
proaches can only prove that the UAPs exist for a given clas-
sifier by crafting one such perturbation (δ). This is very lim-
ited information about the underlying distribution of such
perturbations and in turn about the target classifier itself.
Therefore, a more relevant task at hand is to model the dis-
tribution of adversarial perturbations. Doing so can help us
better analyze the susceptibility of the models against ad-
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Figure 1. Overview of the proposed approach that models the distribution of universal adversarial perturbations for a given classifier. The
illustration shows a batch of B random vectors {z}B transforming into perturbations {δ}B by G which get added to the batch of data
samples {x}B . The top portion shows adversarial batch (XA), bottom portion shows shuffled adversarial batch (XS) and middle portion
shows the benign batch (XB). The Fooling objective Lf (eq. 2) and Diversity objective Ld (eq. 3) constitute the loss. Note that the target
CNN (f) is a trained classifier and its parameters are not updated during the proposed training. On the other hand, the parameters of
generator (G) are randomly initialized and learned through backpropagating the loss. (Best viewed in color).
versarial perturbations. Furthermore, modelling the distri-
butions would provide insights regarding the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples and help to prevent black-box
attacks [23, 17]. It also helps to efficiently generate large
number of adversarial examples for learning robust models
via adversarial training [30].
Empirical evidence [9, 31] has shown that the pertur-
bations exist in large contiguous regions rather than being
scattered in multiple small discontinuous pockets. In this
paper, we attempt to model such regions for a given classi-
fier via generative modelling. We introduce a GAN [8] like
generative model to capture the distribution of the unknown
adversarial perturbations. The freedom from parametric as-
sumptions on the distribution and the target distribution be-
ing unknown (no known samples from the target distribu-
tion of adversarial perturbations) make the GAN framework
a suitable choice for our task.
The major contributions of this work are:
• A novel objective (eq. 2) to craft universal adversar-
ial perturbations for a given classifier that achieves the
state-of-the art fooling performance on multiple CNN
architectures trained for object recognition.
• For the first time, we show that it is possible to model
the distribution (∆) of such perturbations for a given
classifier via a generative model. For this, we present
an easily trainable framework for modelling the un-
known distribution of perturbations.
• We demonstrate empirically that the learned model can
capture the distribution of perturbations and generates
perturbations that exhibit diversity, high fooling capac-
ity and excellent cross model generalizability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2
details the proposed method, section 3 presents compre-
hensive experimentation to validate the utility of the pro-
posed method, section 4 briefly discusses the existing re-
lated works, and finally section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Proposed Approach
This section presents a detailed account of the proposed
method. For ease of reference, we first briefly introduce the
GAN [8] framework.
2.1. GANs
Generative models for images have seen renaissance
lately, especially because of the availability of large
datasets [25, 32] and the emergence of deep neural net-
works. Particularly, Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN) [8] and Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE) [15] have
shown significant promise in this direction. In this work, we
utilize a GAN like framework to model the distribution of
the adversarial perturbations.
A typical GAN framework consists of two parts: a Gen-
erator (G) and a Discriminator (D). The generatorG trans-
forms a random vector z into a meaningful image I; i.e.,
G(z) = I , where z is usually sampled from a simple dis-
tribution (e.g., N (0, 1), U(−1, 1)). G is trained to produce
images (I) that are indistinguishable from real images from
the true data distribution pdata. The discriminator D ac-
cepts an image and outputs the probability for it to be a
real image, a sample from pdata. Typically, D is trained
to output low probability pD when a fake (generated) im-
age is presented. Both G and D are trained adversarially to
compete with and improve each other. A properly trained
generator G at the end of training is expected to produce
images that are indistinguishable from real images.
2.2. Modelling the adversaries
A broad overview of our method is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We first formalize the notations used in the subsequent sec-
tions of the paper. Note that in this paper, we have con-
sidered CNNs that are trained for object recognition [10,
28, 27, 13]. The data distribution over which the classifiers
are trained is denoted as X and a particular sample from
X is represented as x. The target CNN is denoted as f ,
therefore the output of a given layer i is denoted as f i(x).
The predicted label for a given data sample x is denoted as
kˆ(x). Output of the softmax layer is denoted as q, which is
a vector of predicted probabilities qj for each of the target
categories j. The image-agnostic additive perturbation that
fools the target CNN is denoted as δ. ξ denotes the limit on
the perturbation (δ) in terms of its l 8 norm. Our objective
is to model the distribution of such perturbations (∆) for a
given classifier. Formally, we seek to model
∆ = {δ : kˆ(x+ δ) 6= kˆ(x) for x ∼ X and
|| δ || 8 < ξ}
(1)
Since our objective is to model the unknown distribution
of image-agnostic perturbations for a given trained classi-
fier (target CNN), we make suitable changes in the GAN
framework. The modifications we make are: (i) Discrim-
inator (D) is replaced by the target CNN (f) which is al-
ready trained and whose weights are frozen, and (ii) a novel
loss (fooling and diversity objectives) instead of the adver-
sarial loss to train the Generator (G). Thus, the objective
of our work is to train a model (G) that can fool the tar-
get CNN. The architecture for G is also similar to that of
typical GAN which transforms a random sample to an im-
age through a dense layer and a series of deconv layers.
More details about the exact architecture are discussed in
section 3. We now proceed to discuss the fooling objective
that enables us to model the adversarial perturbations for a
given classifier.
2.3. Fooling Objective
In order to fool the target CNN, the generator G should
be driven by a suitable objective. Typical GANs use adver-
sarial loss to train theirG. However, in this work we attempt
to model a distribution whose samples are unavailable. We
know only a single attribute of those samples which is to
be able to fool the target classifier. We incorporate this at-
tribute via a fooling objective to train our G that models the
unknown distribution (∆) of perturbations.
We denote the label predicted by the target CNN on a
clean sample x as benign prediction (c) and that predicted
on the corresponding perturbed sample (x + δ) as adver-
sarial prediction. Similarly, we denote the output vector
of the softmax layer without δ and after adding δ as q and
q′ respectively. Ideally a perturbation δ should confuse the
classifier so as to flip the benign prediction into a different
adversarial prediction. For this to happen, after adding δ,
the confidence of the benign prediction (q′c) should be re-
duced and that of another category should be made higher.
Thus, we formulate a fooling loss to minimize the confi-
dence of benign prediction on the perturbed sample (x+ δ)
Lf = −log(1− q′c) (2)
Fig. 1 shows a graphical explanation of the objective, where
the fooling objective is shown by the blue colored block.
Note that the fooling loss essentially encourages G to gen-
erate perturbations that decrease confidence of benign pre-
dictions and thus eventually flip the label.
2.4. Diversity Objective
The fooling loss only encourages to learn a G that can
guarantee high fooling capability for the generated pertur-
bations (δ). This objective might lead to some local minima
where the G learns only a limited set of effective perturba-
tions as in [18, 21]. However, our objective is to model
the distribution ∆ such that it covers all varieties of those
perturbations. Therefore, we introduce an additional com-
ponent to the loss that encourages G to explore the space
of perturbations and generate a diverse set of perturbations.
We term this objective the Diversity objective. Within a
mini-batch of generated perturbations, this objective indi-
rectly encourages them to be different by separating their
feature embeddings projected by the target classifier. In
other words, for a given pair of generated perturbations
δn and δ′n, our objective increases the distance between
f i(x + δn) and f i(x + δ′n) at a given layer i in the clas-
sifier.
Ld = −
B∑
n=1
d(f i(xn + δn), f
i(xn + δn′)) (3)
where n′ is a random index in [1, B] and n′ 6= n, B is the
batch size, xn, δn are nth data sample and perturbation in
the mini-batch respectively. Note that a batch contains B
perturbations (δ) generated by G (via transforming random
vectors (z)) and B data samples (x). f i is the output of
the CNN at ith layer and d(., .) is a distance metric (e.g.,
Euclidean) between a pair of features. The orange colored
block in Fig. 1 illustrates the diversity objective.
Thus, our final loss becomes the summation of both fool-
ing and diversity objectives and is given by
Loss = Lf + λLd (4)
Since it is important to learn diverse perturbations that ex-
hibit maximum fooling, we give equal importance to both
Lf and Ld in the final loss to learn the G (i.e., λ = 1).
2.5. Architecture and Implementation details
Before we present the experimental details, we describe
the implementation and working details of the proposed ar-
chitecture. The generator part (G) of the network maps the
latent space Z to the distribution of perturbations (∆) for a
given target classifier. The architecture of the generator con-
sists of 5 deconv layers. The final deconv layer is followed
by a tanh non-linearity and scaling by ξ. Doing so restricts
the perturbations’ range to
[−ξ, ξ]. Following [18, 21, 20],
the value of ξ is chosen to be 10 in order to add a quasi-
imperceptible adversarial noise. The generator network is
adapted from [26]. We performed all our experiments on
a variety of CNN architectures trained to perform object
recognition task on the ILSVRC-2014 [25] dataset. We kept
the architecture of our generator (G) unchanged for differ-
ent target CNN architectures and separately learned the cor-
responding adversarial distributions.
During training, we sample a batch of random vectors
z ∈ Rd from the uniform distribution U[−1, 1] which
in turn get transformed by G into a batch of perturba-
tions {δ}B = {δ1, δ2, δ3, . . . , δB} each of size equal to
that of the image (e.g., 224 × 224 × 3). We also sample
B images {x}B = {x1, x2, x3, . . . , xB} from the avail-
able training data to form the mini-batch training data, de-
noted as benign batch (XB). We now add the pertur-
bations to the training data in a one-to-one manner i.e.
one perturbation gets added to the corresponding image of
the batch, which gives us the adversarial batch, XA =
{x1 + δ1, x2 + δ2, x3 + δ3, . . . , xB + δB}. This is shown
in the top portion of Fig. 1. We also randomly shuffle the
perturbations ensuring no perturbation remains in its origi-
nal index in the batch, i.e., {δ1′, δ2′, δ3′, . . . , δB ′} such that
δi 6= δi′, ∀i. With this, we form a shuffled adversarial batch
asXS = {x1+δ1′, x2+δ2′, x3+δ3′, . . . , xB+δB ′}, which
is shown in the bottom portion of Fig. 1. Note that in order
to prepare XS , only the perturbations ({δ}B) are shuffled
but not the data samples ({x}B).
Thus, each of our training iterations consists of three
quasi-batches, namely, (i) Benign images batch XB , (ii)
Adversarial batch XA, and (iii) Shuffled adversarial batch
XS . These are the three portions shown in Fig. 1. We
now feed these through the target CNN (f) and compute
the loss. We obtain the benign predictions (c) over the
clean batch samples {x}B . These labels are used to com-
pute the confidences (q′c) for the corresponding adversarial
batch samples. This forms the fooling objective as shown
in eq. 2. Similarly, we obtain the feature representations at
the softmax layer (probability vectors) for both adversarial
and shuffled adversarial batches (top and bottom portions
of Fig. 1) to compute the diversity component of the loss as
shown in eq. 3. Essentially, our diversity objective pushes
apart the final layer representations corresponding to two
different perturbations (δi and δi′) via maximizing the co-
sine distance between them.
Note that we update only the G part of the network and
the target CNN, which is a pretrained classifier under at-
tack, remains unchanged. We iteratively perform the loss
computation and parameter updation for all the samples in
the training data. During training, we use a small held-out
set of 1000 random images as validation set and stop our
training upon reaching best performance on this set. In our
experiments, the maximum number of epochs is set to 100
and we observe that training of generators for all the target
CNNs gets saturated at around 60− 70 epochs.
3. Experiments
For all our experiments, we worked with 10000 (10 per
category, similar to [18]) training images randomly chosen
from ILSVRC 2014 train set and 50000 images of ILSVRC
2014 validation set as our testing images. The latent space
dimension d is set to 10. We have experimented with spaces
of different dimensions (e.g., 50, 100) and observed that the
fooling rates obtained are very close. However, we observe
the generated perturbations for d = 10 demonstrate larger
visual variety than other cases. Thus, we keep d = 10 for all
our experiments. We use a batch size (B) of 64 for shallow
networks such as VGG-F [7] and GoogLeNet [28], and 32
for the rest. The models are implemented in TensorFlow [1]
with Adam optimizer [14] on a TITAN-X GPU card. Codes
for the project are available at https://github.com/
val-iisc/nag.
3.1. Perturbations and the fooling rates
The fooling rates achieved by the perturbations crafted
by the learned generative model (G) are presented in Ta-
ble 1. Results are shown for seven different network ar-
chitectures trained on ILSVRC-2014 dataset computed for
over 50000 test images. We also investigate the transfer
rates of the perturbations by attacking other unknown mod-
els along with the target CNN. Rows denote a particular
Table 1. Average fooling rates of the perturbations modelled by our generative network vs. UAP [18]. Rows indicate the target net for
which perturbations are modelled and columns indicate the net under attack. Note that, in each row, entry where the target CNN matches
with the network under attack represents white-box attack and the rest represent the black-box attacks. For our method, along with average
fooling rates, the corresponding standard deviations are also mentioned. The best result for each case is shown in bold and UAP best cases
are shown in blue. Mean avg. fooling rate achieved by the Generator (G) for each of the target CNNs is shown in the rightmost column.
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-50 ResNet-152 Mean FR
VGG-F Our 94.10
+− 1.84 81.28+− 3.50 64.15+−3.41 52.93+−8.50 55.39+−2.68 50.56+−4.50 47.67+−4.12 63.73
UAP 93.7 71.8 48.4 42.1 42.1 - 47.4 57.58
CaffeNet Our 79.25
+−1.44 96.44+−1.56 66.66+−1.84 50.40+−5.61 55.13+−4.15 52.38+−3.96 48.58+−4.25 64.12
UAP 74.0 93.3 47.7 39.9 39.9 - 48.0 56.71
GoogLeNet Our 64.83
+−0.86 70.46+−2.12 90.37+−1.55 56.40+−4.13 59.14+−3.17 63.21+−4.40 59.22+−1.64 66.23
UAP 46.2 43.8 78.9 39.2 39.8 - 45.5 48.9
VGG-16 Our 60.56
+−2.24 65.55+−6.95 67.38+−4.84 77.57+−2.77 73.25+−1.63 61.28+−3.47 54.38+−2.63 65.71
UAP 63.4 55.8 56.5 78.3 73.1 - 63.4 65.08
VGG-19 Our 67.80
+−2.49 67.58+−5.59 74.48+−0.94 80.56+−3.26 83.78+−2.45 68.75+−3.38 65.43+−1.90 72.62
UAP 64.0 57.2 53.6 73.5 77.8 - 58.0 64.01
ResNet-50 Our 47.06
+−2.60 63.35+−1.70 65.30+−1.14 55.16+−2.61 52.67+−2.58 86.64+−2.73 66.40+−1.89 62.37
UAP - - - - - - - -
ResNet-152 Our 57.66
+−4.37 64.86+−2.95 62.33+−1.39 52.17+−3.41 53.18+−4.16 73.32+−2.75 87.24+−2.72 64.39
UAP 46.3 46.3 50.5 47.0 45.5 - 84.0 53.27
target CNN for which we have modelled the distribution of
perturbations and the columns represent the classifiers we
attack. Note that in each row, when the target CNN (row)
matches with the system under attack (column), the fooling
indicates the white-box attack scenario and all other entries
represent the black-box attack scenario.
Since our G network models the perturbation space, we
can now easily generate a perturbation by sampling a z and
feeding it through the G. In Table 1, we report the mean
fooling rates after generating multiple perturbations for a
given CNN classifier. Particularly, the white-box fooling
rates are computed by averaging over 100 perturbations and
black-box rates are averaged over 10. The standard devia-
tions are mentioned next to the fooling rates. Also, the mean
average fooling rate achieved by the learned model (G) for
each of the target CNNs is shown in the rightmost column.
Clearly, the proposed generative model captures the pertur-
bations with higher fooling rates than UAP [18]. Note that
of all the 36 entries for which UAP [18] provided their fool-
ing rates, in only 3 cases (indicated in bold faced blue in
Table 1) they perform better than us. The mean fooling rate
(of all the entries in the table, except the rightmost column)
obtained by the UAP [18] is 57.66 and that achieved by our
model is 65.68, which is a significant 8% improvement.
Figure 2 shows the perturbations generated by the pro-
posed generative model for different target CNNs. Note that
each of them is one random sample from the corresponding
distributions of perturbations. Fig. 4 shows a benign sample
and the corresponding perturbed samples after adding per-
turbations for multiple CNNs. Note that the perturbations
are sampled from the corresponding distributions learned
by our method.
Table 2. Effect of training data on the modelling.
1000 2000 4000 10000 50000
White-box 61.54 73.19 78.18 87.24 91.16
Mean BBFR 39.46 45.12 51.87 62.94 67.45
3.2. Effect of training data on the modelling
In this subsection, we examine the effect of available
training data on the learning. We have considered ResNet-
152 model and various training data sizes (equal population
from each category). Table 2 presents the fooling rates ob-
tained by the crafted perturbations in both white-box and
black-box setup. Note that the black-box fooling rates are
obtained by averaging the fooling rates obtained on three
(GoogLeNet, VGG-19 and ResNet-50) CNN models. As
one expects, owing to better modelling induced by avail-
ability of more training data, the fooling rates increase with
available training data.
3.3. Diversity of perturbations
We examine the diversity of the generated perturbations
by our model. It can be interesting to examine the pre-
dicted label distribution after adding the perturbations. Do-
ing so can reveal if there exist any dominant labels that
most of the images get confused to or whether the con-
fusions are diverse. In this subsection, we analyze the
labels predicted by the target CNN after adding pertur-
bations modelled by the corresponding generative mod-
els (G). We have considered VGG-F architecture and the
50000 images from the validation set of ILSVRC-2014.
We compute the mean histogram of the predicted labels
for 10 perturbations generated by our G. The top-5 cat-
egories are: {jigsaw puzzle, maypole, otter,
dome, electric fan}. Though there exists a slight
domination from some of the categories, the extent of dom-
ination is far less compared to [18]. While in our case, 257
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-50 ResNet-152
Figure 2. Sample universal adversarial perturbations for different networks. The target CNN is mentioned below the perturbations. Note
that these are one sample from each of the corresponding distributions and across different samplings of the same generative model the
perturbations vary visually.
Figure 3. Sample perturbations generated by proposed approach (top) and UAP [18] (bottom) for GoogLeNet [28]. Note that the perturba-
tions generated by [18] look very similar to each other, whereas generated by our approach showcase diversity. These results show that the
proposed method faithfully models the distribution of perturbations that can effectively fool the target CNN.
categories account for the 95% of the predicted labels, for
UAP [18], it is 173 categories. The 48.6% relative higher
diversity compared to [18] is attributed to the effectiveness
of the proposed diversity loss (eq. 3) which encourages the
model to explore various regions in the adversarial mani-
fold.
3.4. Traversing the manifold of perturbations
In this subsection, we perform experiments to under-
stand the landscape of the latent space (Z). In case of
GANs, traversing on the learned manifold generally tells
about the signs of memorization [24]. While walking on
the latent space, if the image generations result in semantic
changes, it is considered that the model has learned rele-
vant and interesting representations. However, our gener-
ative model attempts to learn the unknown distribution of
adversarial perturbations with no samples from the target
distribution. Therefore, it is not relevant to investigate for
the smooth semantic changes in the generations but only to
look for smooth visual changes, while retaining the ability
to fool the target classifier.
Figure 5 shows the results of interpolation experiments
on the ResNet-152 [10] classifier. We have randomly taken
a pair of points (z1 and z2) in the latent (Z) space and con-
sidered 10 intermediate points on the line joining z1 and z2.
We have generated the perturbations corresponding to these
intermediate points by feeding them through the learned
generative model (G). Figure 5 shows the generated per-
turbations at the intermediate points along with their fool-
ing rates. We clearly observe that the perturbations change
smoothly between any pair of consecutive points and the
sequence gives a morphing like effect with large number of
intermediate points. For each of the intermediate perturba-
tions, fooling rate is computed over the 50000 images from
the ILSVRC-2014 validation set. In Fig. 5, below each of
these perturbations, corresponding fooling rates are men-
tioned. The high and consistent fooling rates along the path
demonstrate that the modelling of the adversarial distribu-
tion has been faithful. The proposed approach generates
perturbations smoothly from the underlying manifold. We
attribute this ability of our learned generative model to the
effectiveness of the proposed objectives in the loss.
3.5. Modelling adversaries for multiple targets
Transferability of the adversarial perturbations (both im-
age specific and agnostic) has been an intriguing revelation
Clean : Horned viper CaffeNet : N. Terrier GoogLeNet : Hamper VGG-19 : Hyena ResNet-152 : Chiton
Figure 4. A clean image (left most) and corresponding adversarial images crafted for multiple networks along with predictions.
0.0 ∗ z1 + 1.0 ∗ z2 :
87.53
0.1 ∗ z1 + 0.9 ∗ z2 :
87.71
0.2 ∗ z1 + 0.8 ∗ z2 :
87.73
0.3 ∗ z1 + 0.7 ∗ z2 :
87.25
0.4 ∗ z1 + 0.6 ∗ z2 :
87.48
0.5 ∗ z1 + 0.5 ∗ z2 :
88.17
0.6 ∗ z1 + 0.4 ∗ z2 :
87.94
0.7 ∗ z1 + 0.3 ∗ z2 :
87.84
0.8 ∗ z1 + 0.2 ∗ z2 :
88.16
0.9 ∗ z1 + 0.1 ∗ z2 :
87.34
Figure 5. Interpolation between a pair of points in Z space shows that the distribution learned by our generator has smooth transitions. The
figure shows the perturbations corresponding to 10 points on the line joining a pair of points (z1 and z2) in the latent space. Note that these
perturbations are learned to fool the ResNet-152 [10] architecture. Below each perturbation, the corresponding fooling rate obtained over
50000 images from ILSVRC 2014 validation images is mentioned. This shows the fooling capability of these intermediate perturbations
is also high and remains same at different locations in the learned distribution of perturbations.
by many of the recent adversarial perturbations works [29,
9, 22, 18, 21, 20]. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [18] attempted
to explain the cross-model generalizability with the correla-
tion among different regions in the classification boundaries
learned by them. In this subsection, we investigate if we can
learn to model a single distribution of adversaries that fool
multiple target CNNs simultaneously.
We consider all the 7 target CNNs presented in Table 1
to model a single adversarial manifold that can fool all of
them simultaneously. We keep the G part of the proposed
architecture unchanged while we replace single target clas-
sifier with all the target networks. Because of the memory
constraint to fit all the models, we train with a smaller batch
size. The loss to train the generator is the summation of
the individual losses (eq. 4) computed for each of the target
CNNs separately. Thus, the objective driving the optimiza-
tion aims to craft the perturbations that fool all the target
CNNs simultaneously. Similar to the single target case, the
diversity objective (eq. 3) encourages to explore multiple
regions covering the manifold of perturbations and model a
distribution with a lot of variety.
Table 3 presents the mean fooling rates obtained by 10
samples from the distribution of perturbations learned to
fool all the 7 target CNNs. The fooling rates are slightly
lesser than those obtained for the dedicated optimization
(white-box attacks in Tab. 1). However, given the complex-
ity of the modelling, the learned perturbations achieve a re-
markable average fooling rate of 80.07%. Note that this is
around 8% higher than the best mean fooling rate obtained
by an individual network (computed for each row in Tab. 1),
which is 72.62% by VGG-19. This again emphasizes the
effectiveness of the proposed framework and objectives to
simultaneously model perturbations for classifiers with sig-
nificant architectural differences.
Table 3. Mean fooling rates for 10 perturbations sampled from the distribution of adversaries modelled for multiple target CNNs. The
perturbations result an average fooling rate of 80.02% across the 7 target CNNs which is higher than the best mean fooling rate of 72.62%
achieved by the generator learned for VGG-19.
Network VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-50 ResNet-152
Fooling rate 83.74 86.94 84.79 73.73 75.24 80.21 75.84
3.6. Black-box attacks for ensemble generator
In this subsection we present the black-box fooling per-
formance of the learned generator for an ensemble of tar-
get CNNs. We have learned the ensemble generator GE
with an ensemble of 4 (VGG-F, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and
ResNet-50) target CNNs leaving CaffeNet, VGG-19, and
ResNet-152. In Table 4 we report the mean black-box fool-
ing rate (Mean BBFR) obtained by the learned perturbations
computed over the three left out models. For comparison,
we also present the Mean BBFR achieved by the generators
learned for those individual target CNNs computed over the
left out 3 models. Owing to the ensemble of targets, gen-
erator GE learns more general perturbations compared to
the individual generators and achieves higher fooling rate
compared to the individual targets.
Table 4. Generalizability of the perturbations learned by the en-
semble generator (GE).
GV F GG GV 16 GR50 GE
Mean BBFR 60.63 60.15 71.26 61.87 76.40
4. Related Works
Adversarial perturbations [29] have been a tantaliz-
ing revelation about machine learning systems. Specifi-
cally, the deep neural network based learning systems (e.g.,
[9, 19, 23]) are also shown to be vulnerable to these struc-
tured perturbations. Their ability to generalize to unknown
models enables simple ways (e.g., [9]) to launch black-box
attacks that fool the deployed systems. Further, existence of
image-agnostic perturbations [18, 21, 20] along with their
cross model generalizability exposes the weakness of the
current day deep learning models. Differing from previ-
ous works [18, 21], our work proposes a novel, yet simple
and effective objective that enables to learn image-agnostic
perturbations. Although the existing objectives successfully
craft these perturbations, they do not attempt to capture the
space of such perturbations. Unlike the existing works, the
proposed method learns a generative model that can capture
the space of the image-agnostic perturbations for a given
classifier. To the best of our knowledge, the only work
which aims to learn a neural network for generating adver-
sarial perturbations via simple feed-forwarding is presented
by Baluja et al. [2]. They present a neural network which
transforms an image into its corresponding adversarial sam-
ple. Note that it generates image specific perturbations and
doesn’t aim to model the distribution like us.
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN): Goodfellow et
al. [8] and Radford et al. [24] have shown that GANs can be
trained to learn a data distribution and to generate samples
from it. Further image-to-image conditional GANs have
led to improved generation quality [12, 33]. Inspired from
GAN framework, we have proposed a neural network ar-
chitecture to model the distribution of universal adversar-
ial perturbations for a given classifier. The discriminator
(D) part of the typical GAN is replaced with the trained
classifier to be fooled (f). Only the generator (G) part is
learned to generate perturbations to fool the discriminator.
Also, as we don’t have to train D, samples of the target
data (i.e., perturbations) are not presented during the train-
ing. Through a pair of effective loss functions Lf and Ld,
the proposed framework models the perturbations that fool
a given classifier.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the first ever genera-
tive approach to model the distribution of adversarial per-
turbations for a given CNN classifier. We propose a GAN
inspired framework, wherein we successfully train a gener-
ator network that captures the unknown target distribution
without any training samples from it. The proposed objec-
tives naturally exploit the attributes of the samples (e.g., to
be able to fool the target CNN) in order to model their dis-
tribution. However, unlike the typical GAN training that
deals with a pair of conflicting objectives, our approach has
a single well behaved optimization (only G is trained).
The ability of our method to generate perturbations with
state-of-the-art fooling rates and surprising cross-model
generalizability highlights severe susceptibilities of the cur-
rent deep learning models. However, the proposed frame-
work to model the distribution of perturbations also enables
to conduct formal studies towards building robust systems.
For example, Goodfellow et al. [9] introduced adversarial
training as a means to learn robust models and Tramer et
al. [30] extended it to ensemble adversarial training, which
require a large number of adversarial samples. In addition,
the defence becomes more robust if those samples exhibit
diversity and allow the model to fully explore the space of
adversarial examples. While the existing methods are lim-
ited by both generation speed and instance diversity, our
method, after modelling, almost instantly produces adver-
sarial perturbations with lots of variety. We have also shown
that our approach can efficiently model the perturbations
that simultaneously fool multiple deep models.
Appendix
1. Traversing the manifold of perturbations
In this section, we provide additional results for traversing the manifold of adversarial perturbations. On the line join-
ing two random points z1 and z2 in the latent space, we consider 10 intermediate points. We transform these points into
corresponding perturbations by forwarding through the learned G for GoogLeNet [28]. Fig. 1 shows those 10 generated
perturbations. Similar to the results presented on ResNet-152 [10] classifier shown in the main draft (refer to sec.3.3), the
perturbations change smoothly between any pair of consecutive points. The circular patterns in the first image of the top
row slowly disappear by the 4th image (top row) while curtain like patterns emerge from 3rd image of top row, which are
clearly visible by the end of top row. Proceeding further on the path generates wave like patterns shown in middle of bottom
row which transform to a new pattern. Also, the fooling rates are high and consistent along the path. This process again
emphasizes that the proposed model learns relevant representations.
0.0 ∗ z1 + 1.0 ∗ z2 :
89.87
0.1 ∗ z1 + 0.9 ∗ z2 :
89.76
0.2 ∗ z1 + 0.8 ∗ z2 :
90.58
0.3 ∗ z1 + 0.7 ∗ z2 :
91.28
0.4 ∗ z1 + 0.6 ∗ z2 :
91.96
0.5 ∗ z1 + 0.5 ∗ z2 :
89.28
0.6 ∗ z1 + 0.4 ∗ z2 :
91.06
0.7 ∗ z1 + 0.3 ∗ z2 :
91.12
0.8 ∗ z1 + 0.2 ∗ z2 :
91.28
0.9 ∗ z1 + 0.1 ∗ z2 :
90.04
Figure 1. Interpolation between a pair of points in Z space show that the distribution learned by our generator has smooth transitions.
The figure shows the perturbations corresponding to 10 points on the line joining a pair of random points (z1 and z2) in the latent space.
Note that these perturbations are learned to fool the GoogLeNet [28] architecture. Below each perturbation, the corresponding fooling rate
obtained over 50000 images from ILSVRC 2014 validation images is mentioned. This shows the fooling capability of these intermediate
perturbations is also high and it is similar at different locations in the learned distribution of perturbations.
2. Generator details
In this section, we explain the architecture of the generator network in the proposed framework that learns the manifold
of adversarial perturbations for a given target classifier. Table 5 presents the details of the generator network which basically
includes an initial fully connected layer followed by several deconvolutional layers to map the latent space vectors to image
size perturbations. The architecture is adapted from [26] which presents improved techniques to GAN training such as virtual
batch normalization to better stabilize the training of the generator network. Note that for all our experiments, the generator
architecture is fixed independent of the target CNN under attack.
3. Modelling adversaries for Multiple target classifiers
In this section, we present sample perturbations obtained for multi-target case, i.e., the generator is learned to model the
adversaries that can simultaneously fool multiple target classifiers. Fig. 2 shows sample perturbations captured by the learned
distribution. Note that the perturbations exhibit significant visual diversity. Also, in section 7 of this appendix, we show that
the perturbations exhibit diversity in terms of the predicted labels after adding to clean images.
Table 5. Overview of the layers in the generator network to model the adversarial perturbations by transforming a latent space vector z of
dimension 10 to a perturbation of size 224× 224.
Generator
FC (10, 64*7*4*4)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,7,7,64*4)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,14,14,64*2)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,28,28,64*1)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,56,56,64*1)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,112,112,64*1)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,224,224,64*1)
Virtual BN, ReLU
Deconv (1,224,224,3)
10*tanh
Figure 2. Sample perturbations obtained from the distribution of perturbations learned for multiple target classifiers. The G is learned to
craft perturbations which can simultaneously fool the 7 CNNs mentioned in the main draft. Note that the perturbations are of wide variety.
4. Representations for diversity objective
The proposed loss has a diversity component in order for the generative model G to be able to capture all the variations in
the distribution of perturbations. The diversity objectiveLd indirectly increases the distance between any pair of perturbations
generated in a mini-batch (δi and δ′i). The objective projects the feature representations belonging to the adversarial and
shuffled adversarial samples apart. As the transformations learned by layers of the target CNN (D) are fixed, the objective
helps G to generate a diverse set of perturbations that fool the target.
In this subsection, we investigate the effectiveness of multiple feature representations to encourage the diversity in the
modelling of the perturbations. We have worked with VGG-F [7] model for this analysis and considered conv4, conv5 and
softmax layers. For separating features at conv4 and conv5 layers we have employed Euclidean distance and for features
obtained at softmax layer, cosine distance is maximized. Table 6 shows the fooling rates obtained by the proposed objective.
We have run the optimization 10 times and report the mean fooling rates along with their standard deviations. Note that the
fooling performance is almost same (less than 2 % difference) for all the three representations. Also, the standard deviations
are very less indicating the effectiveness of the fooling objective and faithful modelling of the distribution. However, upon
visual investigation, we observe that the variations captured via separating the softmax representations is relatively high.
Thus, we chose to work with representations at softmax layer to learn the generative model of perturbations in all our
experiments.
5. Sample benign and corresponding perturbed images
Fig. 3 shows a set of benign (top row) and corresponding adversarial images (bottom row) for CaffeNet [13]. Labels
provided in the top row are ground truth and in the bottom row are the predicted ones by CaffeNet. Note that different
Table 6. Ablation results for different representations to encourage capturing the diversity in the distribution of perturbations for VGG-F [7]
model. Note the numbers are the fooling rates obtained over a held-out set across 10 runs of the optimization. Right most column reports
the mean fooling rate along with the standard deviation.
PPPPPPPPPP
Feature
+ Metric
#Run
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean (std.)
Conv4 + L2 93.82 93.76 93.95 93.81 93.92 93.86 93.88 93.91 93.87 93.90 93.86 (0.055)
Conv5 + L2 94.77 94.75 94.86 94.76 94.82 94.83 94.95 94.70 94.73 94.87 94.80 (0.072)
Softmax + cosine 93.32 93.63 93.62 93.60 93.52 93.74 93.43 93.64 93.66 93.57 93.57 (0.11)
Table 7. Effect of weighting loss components while learning the generator. Note that weights given to the components correlate to the
resulting performance.
Loss (L) Fooling rate Diversity measure
Lf + 10× Ld 76.26 348
Lf + Ld 86.64 315
Lf + 0.1× Ld 89.04 253
perturbations are added to each of the images which result in different predicted labels.
Starfish Whiptail Steelarchbridge Paintbrush Lipstick
Gibbon Sidewinder Porcupine Ear Tray
Figure 3. Set of benign and corresponding perturbed images for CaffeNet [13]. Top row shows the benign samples with their ground truth
labels below. Bottom row shows the predicted label on the corresponding perturbed images.
6. Weighting the individual loss components
In this section we perform experiments to understand how weighting of the two loss components i.e., diversity objective
(Ld) and fooling objective (Lf ) affects the learning. The target architecture we consider for this set of ablations is ResNet-50
architecture trained on ILSVRC-2014 data. We vary the value of λ (weight given to the diversity objective) from 0.1 to 10 in
steps of 10 and separately learn three generators. Table 7 presents the corresponding fooling rate and diversity measure for
the learned generators. Note that the diversity measure is the number of labels that account for 95% of the predicted labels
after adding the perturbations (Refer sec 3.2.2 of the main draft). Also, these numbers are computed on the 50000 validation
images of ILSVRC-2014 data. Results demonstrate that both the measures clearly reflect the relative weights given to the
corresponding loss components. That is, fooling rate increases from 76.26% to 89.04% as the weight given to Lf increases,
at the same time the number of dominant labels decreases from 348 to 253. This observation clearly demonstrates that the
weights given to the individual loss components correlate with the resulting performance. We can treat the weight λ as an
adjustable hyper parameter in the system that can control the generated perturbations from high fooling - limited variety to
less fooling - wide variety.
7. Diversity in perturbations learned by a generator
In this section we present example perturbed images crafted by adding different perturbations learned by a Generator (G)
to a given benign image. Note that we have learned the G to model the perturbations that simultaneously fool all the 7 target
CNNs mentioned in the main draft (refer to sec.3.4 in the main draft). The predictions are obtained by GoogLeNet [28].
Fig. 4 shows the benign and corresponding perturbed images crafted by adding 4 random perturbations generated by the G.
Leftmost image is a benign sample and the following four images are perturbed samples. The predicted labels are mentioned
below the corresponding images. Note that all the four predictions are different and this demonstrates that the perturbations
(δ) learned by a generator (G) exhibit diversity in terms of the predicted labels. Importantly, we observe similar diversity for
all the generators trained on different target CNNs.
Whiptail Alligator lizard Sidewinder Banded gecko Common newt
Figure 4. Sample benign image (extreme left) and four perturbed images obtained by adding different perturbations learned the proposed
generator (G). Note that the G is learned to fool all the 7 target CNNs and predictions are obtained by GoogLeNet. The ground truth for
the benign image is mentioned in green below it. Predicted labels mentioned below the corresponding images in red and all of them are
different.
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